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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
-
by Victoria Gold* and Diane Whitney** 
This survey of California case law and legislation is a regular 
feature of the Women's Law Forum. The purpose of the Survey 
is to summarize all California Supreme Court cases, Courts of 
Appeal cases, and legislation enacted in the past year that is of 
special importance to women. The focus of the Survey is on pres-
enting issues most pertinent to women, rather than on analyzing 
all issues raised in each case. 
The survey period for cases in this issue is from August 1978 
through May 1979. Summaries of legislation enacted up to Sep-
tember 30, 1978 are included in the fIrst issue of the Women's 
Law Forum. *** Due to the small amount of completed legislative 
action prior to printing time, no legislative summaries are in-
cluded in this volume's Survey. A summary of signifIcant legisla-
tive action from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979 will be 
included in the Survey of Volume 10, due for publication in the 
Spring 1980, and in each issue of the Women's Law Forum 
thereafter. 
* Third Year Law Student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
** Second Year Law Student, Golden Gate University School of Law 
*** 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 583-662 (1979). 
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1. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. RAPE AND OTHER SEX OFFENSES 
1. Certification and Sentencing of Mentally Disordered Sex Of-
fenders 
People v. Barnes, 84 Cal. App. 3d 745,148 Cal. Rptr. 824 (4th 
Dist. 1978). After defendant was convicted of involuntary man-
slaughter, he was examined psychiatrically and declared to be a 
mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO). He received probation 
after his sentence was suspended. Two years later when his pro-
bation was revoked, he was certified to the psychiatric depart-
ment of the superior court and found to be an MDSO not amena-
ble to treatment. 
The court of appeal reversed the holding that certification as 
an MDSO must be based on either a conviction of a sex offense 
requiring registration as an MDSO under Penal Code section 290 
or, alternatively, by clear proof that the offense was committed 
primarily for purposes of sexual arousal or gratification. Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 6302. Here the conviction for invol-
untary manslaughter did not satisfy the legal prerequisites for a 
certification order. 
t People v. Saffell, 87 Cal. App. 3d 157, 150 Cal. Rptr. 804 
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing granted, February 1, 1979. The trial 
court found defendant, charged with rape and sexual perversion, 
to be a mentally disordered sex offender who was amenable to 
treatment. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 
6316.1, defendant was committed to a mental health facility for 
the upper term for his offenses without time offfor good behavior. 
The court of appeal, affirming the conviction but reversing 
the commitment order, found that this sentencing scheme denied 
equal protection to mentally disordered sex offenders amenable 
to treatment since it provides harsher penalties for them than for 
either non-mentally disturbed sex offenders or mentally dis-
turbed sex offenders who are not amenable to treatment. 
t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of 
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any 
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks, 
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole 
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court. 
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2. Psychiatric Exam of Victim 
People v. Mills, 87 Cal. App.3d 302, 151 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1st 
Dist. 1978). In a prosecution for rape, after a jury had been empa-
neled and sworn, the trial court entered a judgment of dismissal 
in favor of defendant because the alleged victim had refused to 
undergo a court ordered psychiatric examination. The court of 
appeal reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing the action. The court held that although the trial 
court has the power to order a psychiatric examination of a victim 
of a sex crime, the sanctions for refusal to cooperate are limited 
and do not extend to forcing the victim to submit to an exam by 
the court'S' contempt power. (Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 
2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966).) The court also 
held that the prosecutor acted properly in advising the victim of 
her right to refuse a psychiatric examination. Finally, the court 
held that although the jury had been empaneled and sworn before 
the cause was dismissed, and the defendant placed in jeopardy, 
since the defendant had consented to the dismissal, a waiver of 
double jeopardy was implied. 
In re Leonard M., 85 Cal. App. 3d 887, 149 Cal. Rptr. 791 
(2nd Dist. 1978), hearing denied, January 3, 1979. A sixteen year 
old boy was made a ward of the juvenile court upon a finding that 
he had committed a lewd act on a five year old girl. The boy 
appealed the case primarily on the ground that his defense attor-
ney had inadequately represented him by failing to order a 
Ballard examination of the victim. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there was nothing 
in the record to suggest that the boy's attorney had not made a 
reasoned tactical decision in foregoing the Ballard motion. 
3. Rape as Great Bodily Injury/Bodily Harm 
People v. Sargent, 86 Cal. App.3d 148, 150 Cal. Rptr. 113 
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing denied, January 18, 1979. Judgments of 
conviction for forcible rape and first degree burglary were af-
firmed; however, the judgment that defendant was sane at the 
time of the offense was reversed because the trial court instructed 
the jury on the M'Naughten test rather than the American Law 
Institute test of sanity. The court of appeal further held that the 
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that forcible rape itself 
constituted great bodily injury. People v. Caudillo, 21 Ca1.3d 562, 
Women's Law Forum 
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580 P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978). But the facts that, as a 
result of the rape, the victim became pregnant and suffered an 
abortion, were significant and substantial physical injuries suffi-
cient to demomstrate great bodily injury. The error did not com-
pel reversal because the jury would have found great bodily injury 
with or without the erroneous instruction. 
People v. Lindsay, 84 Cal. App. 3d 851, 149 Cal. Rptr. 47 
(2nd Dist. 1978). Defendant was convicted of burglary, oral copu-
lation by force, and forcible rape. The jury found, pursuant to an 
instruction that commission of forcible rape or oral copulation 
alone could constitute great bodily injury, that defendant inten-
tionally inflicted great bodily harm during the burglary. The 
prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence that defendant's 
blood type was the same as that found on the victim. The court 
of appeal modified the judgment by striking findings of great 
bodily injury pursuant to People v. Caudillo, 21 Cal.3d 562, 580 
P.2d 274, 146 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1978) and affirmed. 
People v. Hawk, 91 Cal. App. 3d 938, 154 Cal. Rptr. 773 (3rd 
Dist. 1979). A defendant who pleaded guilty to rape by force, 
violence and threat and admitted inflicting great bodily injury on 
the victim was sentenced to the upper term of five years for rape 
and an additional three years for inflicting great bodily injury. 
Defendant appealed on the grounds that the court had erro-
neously used the great bodily injury conviction to enhance the 
sentence for rape. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court's 
finding that the defendant showed "viciousness and callousness," 
apart from the infliction of great bodily injury, was supported by 
evidence that, in addition to stabbing the victim, the defendant 
choked and hit her, had her submit to an act of oral copulation 
before raping her and kicked her afterwards. 
4. Separate Sentencing for Multiple Sex Offenses 
People v. Perez, 23 Cal. 3d 545, 591 P.2d 63, 153 Cal. Rptr. 
40 (1979). Defendant was convicted of, among other offenses, for-
cible rape, forcible sodomy, two counts of forcible oral copulation 
and assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily in-
jury. The trial court sentenced the defendant for rape but stayed 
execution of the sentences for sodomy and oral copulation on the 
9
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grounds that Penal Code section 654 prohibits punishment for 
more than one violation arising out of a given act. 
The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 
applicability of Penal Code section 654 depends upon whether the 
defendant acted with single or multiple objectives. The trial 
court's determination that the defendant's single objective was to 
obtain sexual gratification was too broad and violated the stat-
ute's purpose of ensuring that punishment is commensurate with 
the defendant's culpability. The court held that punishment for 
each of the offenses was not precluded by Penal Code section 654 
since: 1) none of the offenses was committed as a means of com-
mitting any other, 2) none facilitated commission of any other 
and 3) none was incidental to the commission of any other. 
5. Evidence of Rape Victim's Prior Sexual Experience 
People v. Nemie, 87 Cal. App. 3d 926, 151 Cal. Rptr. 32 (3rd 
Dist. 1978), hearing denied, February 1, 1979. The defendant, 
who was convicted of forcibly raping a seventeen year old girl, 
attacked the conviction based on the court's denial of his request 
for a hearing to determine whether the victim had enough prior 
sexual experience to know whether sexual penetration occurred. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court properly exer-
cised its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 denying the 
request. Although the victim's face was covered during the at-
tack, there was no showing by the defendant that prior sexual 
experience was necessary in order for a rape victim to know what 
type of object had penetrated her vagina. 
6. Evidence of Minor's Knowledge of Wrongfulness 
In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
366 (1978). A juvenile court's finding that a minor boy should be 
adjudged a ward of the court as a result of a rape by threat of 
great bodily injury was challenged on the ground that Penal Code 
section 26, subdivision (1) requires that a minor under fourteen 
must be shown to have known that his or her act was wrongful. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the order sustaining the 
petition alleging rape, concluding that the boy recognized that his 
act was wrongful by his need to resort to threats of deadly force, 
and that he took his victim to a secluded location and asked, after 
raping her, if she intended to call the police. Also at issue was 
Women's Law Forum 
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Penal Code section 262 which requires that the physical ability 
of the accused to accomplish penetration must be proved as an 
independent fact and beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the pres-
ence of seminal fluid and sperm, which was revealed in a physical 
examination of the victim shortly after the rape, was held to be 
sufficient evidence of physical ability. 
B. PROSTITUTION 
1. Discovery Requests Allowed Where Defendant Alleges Dis-
criminatory Enforcement 
People v. Municipal Court (Street), 89 Cal. App. 3d 739, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 69, (1st Dist. 1979). Three woman defendants were 
charged with violations of various penal code sections relating to 
prostitution (Penal Code sections 315, 318, and 647 subdivision 
(b». They filed a pretrial motion to dismiss and a supplemental 
motion for discovery alleging denial of equal protection because 
the charges resulted from intentional, purposeful discrimInatory 
law enforcement. The defendants alleged that their discovery re-
quests would provide information to support their motion to dis-
miss. Defendants' declarations alleged, on information and belief, 
that the district attorney had a policy of enforcing these penal 
code statutes against women who were allegedly involved in het-
erosexual prostitution, but not against male homosexuals when 
the violations occurred in certain commercial establishments. 
The trial court granted the requests for discovery; however, the 
prosecution successfully sought a writ of mandate in the superior 
court directing the municipal court to vacate its order on grounds 
that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction. 
The court of appeal vacated the superior court's order and 
reinstated the municipal court's order granting discovery. The 
court held that a defendant may raise a claim of intentional and 
purposeful discrimination in the enforcement of penal statutes, 
and that (s)he may obtain a pretrial discovery order requiring the 
prosecutor to produce information relevant to that claim. Murgia 
v. Municipal Court, 15 Cal. 3d 286, 540 P .2d 44, 124 Cal. Rptr. 
204 (1975). 
The court, rejecting the prosecution's contention, held that 
the defendants had demonstrated a plausible justification for dis-
covery to support their claim of invidious discrimination where 
they alleged the intentional enforcement against a class of indi-
11
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viduals was based on arbitrary sex classification. The court fur-
ther held that the discovery requests specifically related to the 
defense asserted and sought only statistical and other documen-
tary information. Thus the request did not present a circum-
stance (i.e., privileged information) where criminal discovery 
should be denied. 
2. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Pandering 
People v. White, 89 Cal. App. 3d 143, 152 Cal. Rptr. 312 (2nd 
Dist. 1979). Defendant was convicted under Penal Code section 
266i for procuring a place in a house of prostitution for a sixteen 
year old girl. On appeal the defendant charged that he was denied 
due process since the prosecution did not rely on any specific act 
of prostitution to' constitute violation of the statute. 
The court of appeal upheld the conviction, noting first that 
the offense was completed by the defendant's act of procuring a 
place for the girl and second that there was sufficient evidence 
based on her testimony that: 1) he had advised her she would be 
engaging in various sexual acts and told her what to charge and 
2) that she engaged in over one thousand sexual acts during the 
four or five months that she worked for him. 
C. HOMICIDE 
1. Relevance of Husband's Prior Threats to Wife's Claim of Self 
Defense 
People v. Bush, 84 Cal. App. 3d 294, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1st 
Dist. 1978). Defendant stabbed her husband during the course of 
an assault by him against her and was charged with murder under 
Penal Code section 187. Upon completion of evidence, the trial 
court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss first and second 
degree murder charges whereupon the jury convicted the defen-
dant of involuntary manslaughter under Penal Code section 192, 
subdivision (2). 
Because there was uncontradicted evidence that in the 
course of two prior beatings the victim had threatened to kill his 
wife, the court of appeal found prejudicial error in the trial court's 
refusal to give requested instructions to the jury that one who has 
been so threatened may take quicker and stronger measures to 
protect herself during an assault than one who has not received 
such threats. In addition, the admission of evidence that the de-
Women's Law Forum 
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fendant knew she was the beneficiary of her husband's life insur-
ance policy was found to be reversible error. In view of the fact 
that the trial court granted a dismissal of first and second degree 
murder charges, eliminating the question of malice aforethought 
as a matter of law, the court of appeal considered that testimony 
concerning the insurance policy could only confuse the jurors and 
thus should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 
352. 
2. Failure to Charge in Commitment Order 
People v. Superior Ct. (Grilli), 84 Cal. App. 3d 506, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 740 (1st Dist. 1978), hearing denied, October 25, 1978. A 
defendant, charged with attempted murder, rape by force and 
threat, oral copulation and false imprisonment was granted a 
motion to dismiss the attempted murder charge because this 
charge was not named in the commitment order at the prelimi-
nary hearing. The court of appeal issued a unit of mandate setting 
aside the order since the preliminary hearing evidence showed 
that the attempted murder charge was based on probable cause. 
Thus, despite the failure to name the charge in the commitment 
order, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the 
charge. 
Also at issue in the case was the defendant's motion to dis-
miss allegations of great bodily harm as to each of the counts 
charged. Once again the trial court granted the motion and the 
appellate court reversed, holding that since Penal Code section 
12022.7 does not define a separate offense but merely provides for 
an additional three-year sentence where great bodily injury is 
inflicted during the commission of the felony charged, it cannot 
be subject to a motion for dismissal under Penal Code section 995. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. WRONGFUL DEATH AND NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 
1. Elements of Emotional Distress for Death of Fetus 
Austin v. Regents of University of California, 89 Cal. App. 
3d 354, 152 Cal. Rptr. 420 (2nd Dist. 1979). A husband, brought 
an action against the Regents of the University of California and 
a doctor for injuries suffered as a result of the death of his wife 
during delivery of their child, and the subsequent death of the 
unborn child. The trial court entered summary judgment for de-
13
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fendants on the cause of action for emotional distress resulting 
from the death of the child. The court also dismissed the causes 
of action for wrongful death of the child and for breach of defen-
dant's alleged contract to perform delivery of the fetus. 
The court of appeal, in a 2-1 decision, reversed the judgment 
as to the cause of action for emotional distress holding that the 
husband had stated a triable cause of action by sufficiently plead-
ing the three required elements of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 
441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) .. Plaintiff alleged that he 
learned of the death by his own observation of the cessation of life 
in the fetus and that his shock was caused by the sensory and 
contemporaneous realization of the death. The other two required 
elements (presence at the scene and close relationship to the vic-
tim) were not disputed. The Court of Appeal unanimously af-
firmed the dismissals of the causes of action for wrongful death 
and breach of contract and the striking of punitive damages 
against the University of California pursuant to Government 
Code section 818. 
The dissent, relying on Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 
565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977), stated that Justus imposes 
a fourth factor for a cause of action for emotional harm in witness-
ing an accident: that plaintiff must be an involuntary witness and 
is denied recovery if he is a voluntary witness to the accident. The 
dissent assumed that plaintiff was voluntarily in the delivery 
room. 
2. Plaintiff's Inability to Identify the Manufacturer of DES 
t Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 138 (2nd Dist. 1978), modified, 86 Cal. App. 3d 416a, 
hearing granted, Dec. 13, 1978. Two women brought suit for per-
sonal injuries allegedly resulting from prenatal exposure to the 
drug diethylstilbestrol (DES) manufactured by one or more of the 
named defendants. The complaints alleged that DES, ingested 
by plaintiffs' mothers as a miscarriage preventative, caused 
t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of 
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative· statement of any 
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks, 
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole 
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court. 
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plaintiffs to develop precancerous and cancerous tumors and le-
sions. Plaintiffs alleged that there existed a common and mu-
tually agreed-upon formula for the drug, that the various brands 
of DES were marketed by defendants as being fungible and inter-
changeable with all other brands of the drug and that there was 
a pharmaceutical practice of filling prescriptions of DES with a 
brand other than that prescribed. 
The trial court sustained demurrers and dismissed the ac-
tions on the ground that no specific manufacturer was named as 
the party responsible for plaintiffs' injuries. The court of appeal 
reversed holding that it was unnecessary to identify the specific 
manufacturer where plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to satisfy 
pleading requirements in order to hold defendants jointly liable 
on a concerted action theory and/or to shift the burden to defen-
dants on an alternative liability theory. Also, the court held that 
the applicable statute of limitations is Code of Civil Procedure 
section 340 subdivision 3 providing for one year from the time the 
plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered, that she 
has been damaged by defendant's product. 
McCreery v. Eli Lilly & Co., 87 Cal. App. 3d 77, 150 Cal. 
Rptr. 730 (3rd Dist. 1978), modified on denial of rehearing, 88 
Cal. App. 3d 767h. Plaintiff brought an action for negligence and 
for strict liability against one of 142 manufacturers of the drug, 
diethylstilbestrol (DES) for a cervical cell disorder which she 
alleged was attributable to her mother's use of DES to prevent 
miscarriage during pregnancy in 1953. Plaintiff alleged that the 
drug had been negligently tested, manlJ.factured, and marketed 
and that it had been defective, falsely labeled, and that the risks 
of the drug had been misrepresented. The plaintiff was unable to 
identify the specific pharmaceutical compound or the specific 
manufacturer of DES taken by her mother. The trial court 
granted summary judgment for defendant. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that under either negli-
gence or strict liability, plaintiff has the burden of proving the 
identity of the tortfeasor. For the first time on appeal plaintiff 
asserted a theory that all manufacturers of DES are jointly and 
severally liable because each acted in concert with the other. 
Since plaintiff faile"d to plead concert of action at the trial level, 
the case was distinguishable from the factually similar case of 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 
138, hearing granted, Dec. 13, 1978. 
15
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Finally, the court held that strict liability will not be im-
posed on a manufacturer of new or experimental drugs when un-
fortunate consequences occur if the drug has been properly pre-
pared and proper warning is given, and if the potential social 
gains justify its use despite recognized medical risks. 
3. Governmental Immunity for Parole Determinations 
Martinez v. State of California, 85 Cal. App. 3d 430,149 Cal. 
Rptr. 519 (4th Dist. 1978). Plaintiff brought a suit against the 
state and certain correctional employees for the wrongful death 
of his daughter who was murdered by a mentally disordered sex 
offender on parole. The suit, which alleged negligence in the re-
lease of the prisoner, was dismissed when defendants demurred 
on the grounds of governmental immunity. 
The court of appeal affirmed the decision based on Govern-
ment Code section 845.8 which provides that public entities and 
employees are not liable for any injury resulting from a parole 
determination or caused by an escaped prisoner,· arrested person 
or person resisting arrest. The court noted that this immunity 
does not apply to ministerial acts in carrying" out the decision to 
release a prisoner but since the complaint did not allege any 
negligence occurring after the decision the complaint had been 
properly dismissed. 
4. Loss of Consortium Due to Husband's Paralysis 
Rodriquez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 
151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (2nd Dist. 1978), modified 88 Cal. App. 3d 
• 767c, hearing denied, March 29, 1979. A minor issue in this per-
sonal injury action was whether or not a wife should be awarded 
five-hundred thousand dollars for loss of consortium when her 
twenty-two year old husband was rendered triplegic by a job re-
lated accident. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's find-
ing that the award was proper, noting that loss of consortium 
includes loss of love, companionship, affection, and sexual rela-
tions as well as loss of support or services. 
B. INHERrrANcE DETERMINATIONS 
1. Community Property Interest in Partnership 
Kenworthy v. Hadden, 87 Cal. App. 3d 696, 151 Cal. Rptr. 
169 (3rd Dist. 1978). The executor of a decedent's estate filed a 
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complaint for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that the 
devisees of decedent's wife had no claim against decedent's estate 
because they failed to file a timely money claim as creditors in 
probate proceedings pursuant to Probate Code sections 707 and 
732. The decedent husband had used community property to 
enter a partnership. Following his wife's death, her community 
property interest in the partnership (one-half of husband's one-
half interest) went to the devisees under her will, and thereafter 
at all times the husband paid the devisees their share of profits 
and proceeds, e.g., one-fourth interest in the partnership. The 
trial court ordered the executor to account for and pay over to the 
devisees one-fourth interest in the partnership upon liquidation 
and winding up. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the devisees of a 
wife's community property interest in her husband's partnership 
held a present, existing interest in the partnership that entitled 
them to share in its income and surplus, and did not have a 
general creditor's claim against the estate. The court found that 
Corporations Code section 15025, which clarifies the character of 
a partnership, does not characterize the nature of the partnership 
interest as between husband and wife, which may still be com-
munity property despite the statute. Therefore, the court ruled 
that the devisees having a present existing interest in the partner-
ship need not present a creditor's money claim under Probate 
Code section 707 and were entitled to claim as owners of one-half. 
of the husband's partnership interest. 
2. Actions Authorized Against Surviving Spouse Under Probate 
Code Section 205 
Spurr v. Spurr, 88 Cal. App. 3d 614, 151 Cal. Rptr. 813 (4th 
Dist. 1979). Under a divorce decree, a father was required to 
maintain a $15,000 life insurance policy in favor of his daughter. 
Mter his death, the daughter sought to recover the $15,000 from 
her father's second wife on the theory of constructive trust. The 
daughter alleged that her father did not maintain the life insur-
ance in his second wife's favor, and that his wife had received the 
money as a beneficiary. The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for defendant because the plaintiff failed to establish the 
elements of a constructive trust. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the complaint 
stated a cause of action under Probate Code section 205 which 
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authorizes an action against the surviving spouse, in lieu of an 
action against the estate, where the deceased spouse's assets have 
not been subjected to formal probate administration. Thus, the 
plaintiff did not have to establish the elements of a constructive 
trust: reliance on a mistaken legal theory did not justify entry of 
judgment against her. The court further held that since defen-
dant, in her declaration in support of her motion for summary 
judgment, did not establish any defense to an action pursuant to 
Probate Code section 205, there remained triable issues of fact. 
3. ,Effect of Spouse-Beneficiary's Untimely Death on Inheri-
tance Tax Question 
Estate of Logan, 84 Cal. App. 3d 717,148 Cal. Rptr. 819 (2nd 
Dist. 1978). The trial court decided that no inheritance tax was 
owed on the portion of decedent's estate which he had put in trust 
for the benefit of his wife. The wife had died while the estate was 
still in administration, but before the trust had been established 
or before the wife's power of appointment was exercised. 'The 
court of appeal reversed, holding that the transfer of the general 
power of appointment created an immediate interest in the wife 
at the time of her husband's death and although she did not have 
the opportunity to exercise this power before her death, the estate 
was not exempt from inheritance taxes. 
4. Severance of Joint Tenancy by Property Settlement Agree-
ment 
Estate of Asvitt, 92 Cal. App. 3d 348, 154 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1st 
Dist. 1979). At issue was whether a joint tenancy deed between a 
decedent and his former wife had been severed by a property 
settlement agreement which provided that the family home 
would be sold either when the former wife remarried, the young-
est child reached majority or at any time the parties mutually 
agreed. The trial court found that the joint tenancy had been 
severed and that the decedent's interest in the home should, 
therefore, pass to an unrelated person who was the sole benefici-
ary named in his will. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that interference with 
the right of survivorship, one of the four essential unities of a joint 
tenancy, severs the joint tenancy. The court further held that 
agreements to sever are effective and the-intervening death of one 
of the parties before the agreement is performed does not defeat 
the severance. 
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C. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Community Interest in Retirement Benefits And Pension 
Plans 
Johns v. Retirement Fund Trust, 85 Cal. App. 3d 511, 149 
Cal. Rptr. 551 (4th Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the 
trial court ordered the husband's retirement fund trust to pay 
directly to the wife her one-half interest in the retirement pay-
ments. The retirement fund refused, claiming under federal 
preemption it was required to pay the benefit solely to the hus-
band and the wife was required to collect ·from him. The record 
indicated the benefits were 100 percent community prop~rty, 
listed in the husband's name and were entirely vested. 
The fund, not the husband, appealed. The court of appeal 
affirmed, holding that the federal Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA) does not preempt California lawas applied 
here in matrimonial matters. The court also held that the 
spendthrift features of ERISA were not applicable to the wife, 
since she was an owner, not a creditor. 
In re Marriage of Campa, 89 Cal. App. 3d 113,152 Cal. Rptr. 
362 (1st Dist. 1979), modification of opinion on denial of 
rehearing, 93 Cal. App. 3d 474a, hearing denied, April 12, 1979. 
Three cases, consolidated on appeal, were brought in connection 
with marriage dissolution proceedings when non-employee 
spouses (wives) sought orders directing the employee spouses' 
pension fund to pay the community property share of benefits 
directly to each of them. In one action, judgment was entered 
dismissing the fund; in the other two actions the fund was ordered 
to pay a specified portion directly to the non-employee spouses. 
The court of appeal reversed the judgment dismissing the 
fund with directions to enter judgment in favor of the non-
employee spouse. The other judgments were affirmed. The court 
rejected the fund's contention that the federal Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-empted state law. The 
court held that although the purpose of ERISA was to assure that 
pension rights were "real" and to protect those rights from state 
interference, Congress did not intend to preclude the states from 
effectuating a fair division of community property pension bene-
fits between former spouses. The court noted that the integrity 
of the fund remains unaffected by the division of assets in a 
dissolution proceeding. The court further held that there was no 
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requirement here to exhaust administrative remedies by applica-
tion to the fund's trustees since their decision was certain to be 
adverse. Finally, the court held that the ERISA restriction on 
assignment or alienation of pension benefits does not prohibit 
division of community property benefits between an employee 
and his former spouse who is an owner, not a creditor. 
In re Marriage of Johnston, 85 Cal. App. 3d 900, 149 Cal. 
Rptr. 798 (2nd Dist. 1978). The administrators of a husband's 
pension plans were joined as parties in a dissolution proceeding. 
Th~y contended that they were not required to pay pension bene-
fits directly to a non-employee spouse because the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which they claimed 
preempted California's community property laws, forbade any 
such assignment of benefits. The trial court ordered that the ben-
efits be paid directly to the wife but also authorized a deduction 
of five dollars per month for administrative costs. 
The court of appeal affirmed that part of the judgment which 
ordered direct payment to the spouse holding that Congress did 
not intend to preempt state domestic relations laws and that a 
spouse's claim to her share of community property, including 
pension plans, does not involve an assignment but is merely an 
assertion of an ownership right. The court reversed that part of 
the judgment which allowed a deduction for administrative costs 
on the grounds that no excess administrative costs had been dem-
onstrated. 
In re Marriage of Kasper, 83 Cal. App. 3d 388,147 Cal. Rptr. 
821 (2nd Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Sept. 27, 1978. A husband 
appealed the trial court's decision in a dissolution proceeding 
that: 1) he could keep the full interest in his retirement fund 
while his wife kept the family home; and 2) that he must also pay 
attorney fees and costs. The court of appeal affirmed, holding 
that the trial court properly used the present value of the stream 
of payments over the husband's 'life expectancy in calculating the 
community property interest in the retirement plan. Also, it was 
within the trial court's discretion to give the entire interest in the 
retirement fund to the husband while awarding other assets of 
equal value to the wife. The costs and attorney fees award was 
held proper since there was a considerable disparity in the income 
of the two spouses and the wife, who was caring for an emotionally 
disturbed daughter, was expected to have higher living costs. 
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In re Marriage of Borges, 83 Cal. App. 3d 771, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
118 (1st Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 25, 1978. In an interlocu-
tory judgment of dissolution, the settlement agreement incorpo-
rated into the judgment provided for the division of any assets 
which were later determined to be community property. At the 
time of the judgment the husband's retirement benefits from pri-
vate employment were not taken into account due to a mistaken 
belief that he had no vested rights in them. Two years later the 
wife, having discovered this error, obtained an order to show 
cause why the husband should not have to pay half the value of 
the retirement benefit over to her. At the hearing, the wife's coun-
sel, rather than seeking the remedy of enforcement provided for 
in the agreement, instead asked for a modification of the dissolu-
tion decree which would treat the retirement benefits as a com-
munity asset. The trial court denied the modification. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that it was not error 
for the trial court to deny modification since no basis for modifi-
cation was shown to exist and agreed with the trial court that, in 
asking for modification, the wife had impliedly abandoned the 
existing remedy of enforcement. The court refused to rule on the 
husband's contention that any interest the wife might have in the 
retirement plan was extinguished upon her death noting that, 
although this rule is applied to public retirement plans, its appl-
icability to a private plan would have to be determined by the 
trial court after careful analysis of both the plan and the circum-
stances of the parties. 
2. Social Security Benefits Characterized as Community Prop-
erty 
t In re Marriage of Hillerman, 88 Cal. App. 3d 372, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 764 (4th Dist. 1979), hearing granted, April 12, 1979 and 
cause retransferred to court of appeal for reconsideration in light 
of Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, __ U.S. __ , 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 
L.Ed. 2d 1 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
found that the husband's social security benefits were not com-
munity property and that no community interest existed in the 
benefits despite the. stipulation of the parties that during their 
marriage the husband's contributions to the social security sys-
t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of 
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any 
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks, 
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P .2d 438, (1937). For such cases appear in this Survey for the sole purpose 
of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court. 
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tem were made with community funds. Accordingly, the trial 
court did not retain jurisdiction to divide the benefits. The trial 
court based its decision upon the authority of In re Marriage of 
Kelley, 64 Cal. App. 3d 82, 134 Cal. Rptr. 259 (2nd Dist. 1976), 
which rejected the argument that sodal security benefits are a 
divisible community asset. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court 
should have reserved jurisdiction for the purpose of dividing the 
husband's social security benefits. The court held that neither 
state nor federal law barred recognition of a community interest 
in social security benefits. When contributions of community 
funds or labors have qualified a married person for benefits, a 
community property interest in those benefits exists at the time 
of the dissolution of marriage. The court noted the difficulties in 
tracing benefits to the contributed community assets as well as 
the difficulty in the valuation of the benefits. Nonetheless, the 
court held that Congress, by enacting the Social Security Act, did 
not intend to interfere 'with a state court's jurisdiction over distri-
bution of marital property at dissolution of marriage. The court 
of appeal ordered the opinion unpublished. 
3. Military Pension Rights 
In re Marriage of Stenquist, 21 Cal. 3d 779,582 P.2d 96, 148 
Cal. Rptr. 9 (1978). When a retired serviceman may elect to re-
ceive either a disability pension or a retirement pension, only the 
excess disability rights are properly the husband's separate prop-
erty. In a divorce proceeding the balance of pension rights ac-
quired during the marriage replace ordinary "retirement" pay 
and thus are classed as a community asset. In a six to one deci-
sion, the California Supreme Court (Clark dissenting) affirmed 
this division of marital property; otherwise a serviceman could 
defeat the community interest in his right to a pension by his 
unilateral election. The court reversed the judgment to the extent 
that the trial court limited its jurisdiction to modify spousal sup-
port to twenty-four months. The high court held this to be an 
abuse of discretion because the record indicated a twenty-five 
year marriage and there was no evidence concerning future earn-
ings or employment opportunities for either husband or wife, 
which would support any assertion that the wife would attain 
economic self-sufficiency within that twenty-four-month period. 
Sangiolo v. Sangiolo, 87 Cal. App. 3d 511, 151 Cal. Rptr. 27 
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(4th Dist. 1978). Though both parties in a dissolution proceeding 
were aware of the husband's vested military retirement benefits, 
no reference was made to them because of legal uncertainty as to 
whether they were considered community property. The original 
petition noted that there was additional community property, the 
exact nature of which was unknown and asked for leave to amend 
when its nature was ascertained. Six and one-half years later the 
wife filed an action for partition and an accounting and the trial 
court sustained the husband's demurrer on the grounds of the 
statute of limitations, laches and res judicata. The court of ap-
peal reversed holding that: 1) no statute of limitations applies to 
an action for a partition and an accounting; 2) since the court had 
not been made aware of the retirement benefits they could not 
divide them an9. thus res judicata did not apply; and 3) laches 
was not grounds for sustaining a demurrer since it was unclear 
when the wife learned of her community interest in these benefits 
and there was no suggestion that the delay was prejudicial to the 
husband. 
Gorman v. Gorman, 90 Cal. App. 3d 454, 153 Cal. Rptr. 479 
(4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, May 10, 1979. A former wife 
brought separate actions against her former husband for division 
of the community interest in his military retirement benefits and 
against her attorney for failure to assert that interest during the 
dissolution proceedings. The trial court awarded the wife her 
community interest in the retirement plan and assessed only 
nominal damages of one dollar against the attorney on the 
grounds that the loss occassioned by his negligence was com-
pletely offset by the judgment against the husband. • 
The court of appeal affirmed the judgment against the hus-
band noting that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the 
action since the issue of military retirement benefits was not ad-
dressed or adjudged in the earlier dissolution proceeding. But 
since there was no certainty that the wife could enforce the judg-
ment against her ex-husband, the court of appeal modified the 
judgment against the attorney holding the attorney liable in the 
same amount as the former husband, and awarded, costs, with 
credit for any amount the former husband actually paid as a 
result of the judgment. The court also distinguished the recent 
U.S. Supreme Court case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, __ U.S. 
_, 99 S. Ct. 802, 59 L. Ed.2d 1 (1979). 
Bridges v. Bridges, 82 Cal. App. 3d 976, 147 Cal. Rptr. 471 
(4th Dist. 1978), hearing denied, Sept. 14, 1978. A wife failed to 
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assert a claim for her community property interest in her hus-
band's military retirement benefits at the time of dissolution pro-
ceedings. She later filed suit to claim that interest. The trial court 
sustaining the husband's demurrer, and following Kelley u. 
Kelley, 73 Cal. App. 3d 672, 141 Cal. Rptr. 33 (4th Dist. 1977), 
held that the doctrine of res judicata barred the wife from assert-
ing such claim. The court of appeal reversed following the holding 
in Lewis u. Superior Court, 77 Cal. App. 3d 844, 144 Cal. Rptr. 1 
(3rd Dist. 1978) that res judicata does not apply. The Court noted 
that these earlier appellate decisions were irreconcilable on the 
issue raised, and recommended that the husband in the instant 
case seek review in the Supreme Court. 
Fenn u. Harris, 91 Cal. App. 3d 772, 154 Cal. Rptr. 21 (4th 
Dist. 1979). Eight years after dissolution proceedings in which the 
community 'property had been divided, a woman brought an ac-
tion to partition her former husband's vested, matured military 
pension and his unvested state retirement benefits. The trial 
court granted summary judgment to the husband on the grounds 
of res judicata. 
The court of appeal reversed based on the facts that 1) the 
property settlement agreement which had been incorporated into 
the dissolution judgment expressly provided that community 
property rights not mentioned in the agreement could be dealt 
with later and 2) at the time of the agreement it had not been 
legally determined that the benefits in question were community 
property, as was later decided In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 
3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976). 
4. Husband's Fiduciary Duty 
In re Marriage of Connolly, 23 Cal. 3d 590, 591 P .2d 911, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 423 (1979). The trial court denied a wife's motion to 
reopen the interlocutory and final judgments of dissolution of her 
marriage pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473. This 
section allows for relief from a judgment made against a party 
through mistake or excusable neglect when there is proof of fraud. 
The parties had substantial community interest in a corporation 
of which the husband was a director. The wife based her claim of 
fraud on the fact that, upon valuation of their stock at dissolu-
tion, her husband failed to advise her that a public sale which 
would greatly increase the value of the stock was planned. 
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The court of appeal upheld the trial court's determination 
that the husband had not breached any fiduciary duty as a direc-
tor since: 1) the public offering of the stock had been published 
in newspapers; 2) a cursory examination of the stocks background 
by the wife or her attorney would have revealed the information; 
and 3) the husband testified that he had, in fact, mentioned the 
proposed sale to his wife. As to any separate fiduciary duty arising 
from the marital relationship, the court of appeal sustained the 
trial court's finding that the relationship had clearly become ad-
versarial upon filing for dissolution, thus ending any fiduciary 
obligation which might otherwise have existed. 
5. Valuation of Community Property in Bifurcated Proceeding 
• 
In re Marriage of Walters, 91 Cal. App. 3d 535,154 Cal. Rptr. 
180 (4th Dist. 1979). In a bifurcated dissolution proceding the 
trial court: 1) valued the community residence at fifty thousand 
dollars, its value at the time of the independent proceeding for 
the division of community property, and 2) ordered the parties to 
sell the home and divide the proceeds equally. At the time of the 
proceedings to dissolve the marriage two years earlier, the house 
was worth approximately twenty-six thousand dollars and the 
wife and child had since lived in the residence and made all the 
payments on the house. 
The court of appeal affIrmed the trial court's determination 
that: 1) the property should be valued at the time of trial on the 
division of property rather than at the earlier dissolution proceed-
ing pursuant to Civil Code § 4800(a); and 2) since the increased 
value of the house had resulted from inflation and market fluc-
tuation as opposed to any personal efforts, both parties should 
share equally in the profits. 
6. Tenancy In Common As Alternative to Promissory Note 
In re Marriage of Herrmann, 84 Cal. App. 3d 361, 148 Cal. 
Rptr. 550 (2nd Dist. 1978). The trial court, in a dissolution pro-
ceeding, awarded the family residence to the wife for the benefit 
of the minor child in her custody and, in order to equalize the 
community property distribution, ordered the wife to give the 
husband a promissory note for one-half the market value of the 
house minus the outstanding encumbrance. The note was to yield 
seven percent (7%) simple interest annually and was to be paid 
upon sale of the property, at such time as certain enumerated 
contingencies occurred. 
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While the court of appeal upheld the right of the trial court 
to award the family residence to the custodial parent as a form 
of child support, it found as reversible error the lower court's 
contention that the promissory note equalized the distribution of 
property. Responding to evidence that the note, if sold, would 
have to be discounted by forty percent (40%) of fifty percent 
(50%) due to all its contingencies, the court determined that a 
more just alternative would be to place the property in a tenancy 
in common with each spouse retaining an undivided one-half 
interest until such time as the property was sold. 
7. Distribution of Out of State Property 
t In re Marriage of Fink, 92 Cal. App. 3d 270, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
47 (2nd Dist. 1979), hearing. granted, July 12, 1979. In a dissolu-
tion proceeding the parties held real property in Florida which 
exceeded the value of all other community assets. The trial court 
awarded certain of the Florida real property to the husband and 
the remainder to the wife and also awarded the couple's personal 
residence in California to the wife. The trial court later granted 
the husband's motion for new trial. 
The court of appeal affirmed the grant of a new trial and 
found error in the trial court's division of the property. While it 
would have been permissible to divide up the property in this 
manner had the out of state assets been equal to or less than the 
other community property assets, since the out of state assets 
exceeded the value of other community property, Civil Code sec-
tion 4800 required an equal, in-kind distribution of the out of 
state interests. The trial court should, therefore, have ordered the 
husband to convey a one-half interest in all the Florida property 
to his wife. In addition, the court of appeal found that the hus-
band should have been awarded an equal share in the California 
residence since there were no circumstances (such as minor chil-
dren living in the home) to warrant an exception to the equal 
division requirement. 
t Since the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the court of 
appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative statement of any 
principle oflaw. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing Knouse v. Nimocks, 
8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438, (1937). Four such cases appear in this Survey for the sole 
purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the high court. 
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D. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
1. Standard of Proof for Termination of or Interference with 
Parental Rights 
In re Terry D., 83 Cal. App. 3d 890, 148 Cal. Rptr. 221 (3rd 
Dist. 1978). Civil Code section 232 subdivision (a)(2) provides 
that a child may be declared free from parental control and cus-
tody when the child has been cruelly treated or neglected. Civil 
Code section 232 subdivision (a)(7) provides for termination of 
parental rights after foster care for two or more consecutive years, 
if the court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that return of the 
child to the parents would be detrimental and that the parents 
had failed in the past and were likely to fail in the future to 
maintain an adequate relationship with the child. 
In a proceeding to declare six children free from parental 
control pursuant to Civil Code section 232, the trial court found 
by a preponderance of the evidence that all the children had been 
neglected within the meaning of section 232 subdivision (a)(2). 
The court of appeal reversed and ordered the trial court to recon-
sider its findings using a standard of "clear and. convincing" 
proof. The court held on the basis of recent California decisions, 
that when severance of parental custody is at issue, the higher 
standard is required. In re B. G., 11 Cal. 3d 679, 523 P .2d 244, 114 
Cal. Rptr. 444 (1974); In re Christopher B., 82 Cal. App. 3d 608, 
147 Cal. Rptr. 390 (3rd Dist. 1978). 
The court further held that there is no denial of equal protec-
tion to have different standards of proof for sections 232(a)(2) and 
232(a)(7). The former section involves a single and simple finding 
of cruel treatment whereas the latter involves findings of detri-
ment to the child, plus findings of past and likely future failings 
of the parent(s) to a) provide a home, b) provide care and control, 
and c) maintain an adequate parental relationship. To require a 
more stringent standard of proof for more serious and complex 
findings is rationally related to the legislative purpose in making 
such a classification and therefore constitutionally sound. 
Finally, the court held that to satisfy the requirement of 232 
subdivision (a)(7) concerning past parental failings, it is proper 
to consider conduct during the time before a child is placed in a 
foster home as well as conduct during the two or more years after 
such placement. 
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In re Lynna B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 682, 155 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1st 
Dist. 1979), hearing denied, July 19, 1979. In an action brought 
under Civil Code section 232 subdivision (a)(7) the trial court 
granted the petition of foster parents to declare a six year old girl 
free from the custody and control of her natural parents. Evi-
dence showed that, at the mother's suggestion, the child had been 
placed with petitioners shortly after birth and the mother had 
maintained only minimal contact with the child thereafter. Al-
though the mother could provide a house for the child, the trial 
court found that the child had never been in the house and had 
"put down deep roots" with the foster parents. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there was sufIi-
cient evidence, including testimony by psychiatrists and social 
service practitioners, that returning the child to her mother would 
be detrimental. The court also held that the failure of the trial 
court to consider less severe alternatives, such as child protective 
services, did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to grant the 
petition. There was evidence to support implied findings that 
such services were considered, but rejected since efforts at reunifi-
cation were likely to be unproductive. 
In re Phillip B., 92 Cal. App. 3d 796, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48 (1st 
Dist. 1979); modified on denial of rehearing, 93 Cal. App. 3d 
10lOe, hearing denied, July 19, 1979. The juvenile probation 
department filed a petition under Welfare and Institution Code 
section 300, subdivision (b) alleging that a twelve year old boy 
was not being provided with the necessities of life because his 
parents refused to consent to cardiac surgery for a congenital 
defect. The court dismissed the petition because medical testi-
mony indicated a higher-than-average risk of post-operative com-
plications since the boy also suffered from Down's Syndrome. 
The court of appeal concurred holding that, although the 
state has a right to protect children, there must be clear and 
convincing evidence that the child is not being provided with the 
necessities of life before the state can substitute its judgment 
about medical care for that of the parents. The court enumerated 
the relevant factors. In this case, the court found that there was 
substantial evidence to support the trial court's dismissal in view 
of the risk to the child in having surgery. 
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2. Termination of Parental Custody Due to Mother's Mental 
Disability 
In re Heidi T., 87 Cal. App. 3d 864, 151 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1st 
Dist. 1978). Pursuant to Civil Code section 232 (a)(6), two minor 
wards of the court, ages eleven and twelve years old, were de-
clared to be free of parental custody and control and referred to 
the Department of Social Services for adoptive placement. The 
minors had lived for ten years with foster parents who wished to 
adopt them. The trial court found that as a result of the mother's 
mental disability, it would be detrimental to return custody of 
the children to her. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the appropriate 
standard of proof was "clear and convincing evidence" and that 
even though the record was silent as to which standard was em-
ployed, on review the court found substantial evidence to support 
the trial court's conclusions. The court further held that testi-
mony of two psychiatrists constituted sufficient evidence to sup-
port the finding that the mother's continuing mental illness ren-
dered her incapable of providing support for the children. The 
court also held that the statutory test under Civil Code section 
232(a)(6) sanctioning termination of parental custody was not 
unconstitutionally vague. Finally, the court found that the trial 
court complied with the statutory mandate to consider less dras-
tic means prior to terminating the parent-child relationship. 
In re David B., 91 Cal. App. 3d 184, 154 Cal. Rptr. 63 (5th 
Dist. 1979). A child was forever freed from the custody and con-
trol of his mother pursuant to Civil Code section 232 subdivision 
(a)(6) which allows for termination of the parental relationship 
where the parent is mentally ill and will remain so as testified to 
by two physicians. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Civil Code section 
232 subdivision (a)(6) does not violate substantive due process 
provided that 1) the mental illness is settled and will, in the 
opinion of two physicians, continue indefinitely regardless of 
medical treatment, 2) the parent is given an opportunity to chal-
lenge any reports upon which the decision to terminate the rela-
tionship is based, and 3) the severance of the relationship is found 
to be the least detrimental alternative available for the welfare 
of the child. 
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3. Grounds for Setting Aside an Adoption 
Adoption of Jason R., 88 Cal. App. 3d 11, 151 Cal. Rptr. 501 
(2nd Dist. 1979). A stepfather moved to set aside his previous 
stepparent adoption on the ground that the adoption had been 
fraudulently induced by the natural mother's misrepresentation 
as to her willingness to bear his children. Prior to the instant 
action, the stepfather had successfully sought an annulment of 
the marriage based on extrinsic fraud. The trial court denied the 
motion, without considering the best interests of the child, on the 
ground that the stepfather had failed to sustain his burden on the 
issue of fraud. 
The court of appeal reversed and remanded for a hearing on 
the issue of the best interests of the child holding that this alone 
could constitute sufficient grounds for setting aside an adoption. 
The court further held that the prior determination of fraud in 
the inducement of marriage in the annulment proceedings was a 
different issue than the fraud alleged here and hence the doctrine 
of collateral estoppel was inapp1icabl~. Finally, the court held 
that although annulment has the effect of rendering the marriage 
void ab initia, and "relates back," the decree will not be applied 
to invalidate the stepparent and stepson relationship created by 
a stepparent adoption. 
4. Joint Custody 
In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
157 (1st Dist. 1979). In a marriage ·dissolution proceeding, the 
trial court awarded physical custody of the two minor children to 
the mother and joint legal custody to both parents. The husband, 
who was ordered to pay child support, could claim the children 
as dependants for tax purposes. In addition, the court awarded 
spousal support to terminate on a specific date without reserving 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
The court of appeal affirmed that part of the judgment allow-
ing the father to claim the children as tax dependants but modi-
fied the other' provisions of the order. In view of bitter disputes 
between the parents over custody and visitation rights, the court 
held that it was not in the best interests of the children to award 
joint legal custody. Since the wife had health problems which 
made her future ability to support herself questionable, the court 
of appeal held that it was error for the trial court to relinquish 
jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support. 
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5. Child Custody Disputes Involving More Than One State 
In re Marriage of Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d 402, 150 Cal. Rptr. 
860 (1st Dist. 1978). In a California dissolution proceeding, each 
parent was awarded custody of one child; the father took custody 
of their son and the mother took custody of their daughter. Mter 
the father and son moved to Rhode Island, the son returned to 
California for a visit with his mother. The mother then brought 
an action to convert her visitation rights into permanent custoq.y. 
The father brought a parallel action in Rhode Island. The Califor-
nia court refused to transfer the case to Rhode Island and 
awarded permanent custody of the son to the mother. Thereafter, 
the Rhode Island Court reached the opposite result. 
On appeal by the father, the court of appeal reversed holding 
that the California court should have stayed the proceedings to 
permit final adjudication of the custody issue in Rhode Island 
since there was no showing that the child's health or safety would 
be jeopardized if he were returned to his father. Ferreira v. 
Ferreira, 9 Cal. 3d 824,512 P.2d 304, 109 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1973); see 
Civil Code sections 5150 et seq. (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The 
court also held that although the California court had jurisdiction 
in the matter, the trial court abused its discretion in modifying 
custody where it did not make a finding that a change in custody 
was in the best interests of the child and the court did not con-
sider all available evidence in making its determination. 
In re Marriage of Steiner, 89 Cal. App. 3d 363, 152 Cal. Rptr. 
612 (4th Dist. 1979). A child custody decree originally issued in 
California was modified at a Colorado hearing after the mother 
and child had been living in Colorado for eight months. The 
father in California petitioned for a modification of the Colorado 
decree but the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of juris-
diction. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Civil Code 
section 5152, which gives jurisdiction to the child's home state or 
state with a significant relationship to the child-now Colo-
rado-prevails over the conflicting continuing jurisdiction provi-
sions of Code of Civil Procedure 410.50 and Civil Code section 
4600. 
6. Validity of Foreign Ex Parte Custody Orders 
Miller v. Superior Court, 22 Cal. 3d 923, 587 P .2d 723, 151 
Cal. Rptr. 6 (1978). A divorced woman who moved with her chil-
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dren from Australia to the United States, without notice to either 
her former husband or the Australian Court which granted her 
custody, was found in violation of the Australian custody decree 
by the Los Angeles Superior Court. She was ordered to comply 
with an Australian ex parte restraining order requiring that she 
deliver custody to the husband. The wife appealed the decision 
to the California Supreme Court claiming she had not been given 
reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard at the Australian 
proceeding. 
The high court found that several unsuccessful attempts to 
locate the wife had been made, notice of the hearing had been 
given to her solicitors in Australia, a showing of irreparable harm 
to the children had been made to the court, the orders contem-
plated only a temporary change of custody and the wife, learning 
of the hearing within a month, had made no subsequent efforts 
to reopen the Australian proceedings. As a result, the court held 
that the wife had not been denied reasonable notice and that the 
Australian orders were therefore valid and enforceable. 
Neal v. Superior Court., 84 Cal. App. 3d 847, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
841. (2nd Dist. 1978). A couple whose child was born in California 
moved to Arkansas where they were divorced. Custody of the 
child was awarded to the father by stipulation. However, the wife 
violated this order and moved back to California with the child, 
claiming that the child suffered serious allergies in Arkansas. The 
trial court granted the mother's petition for temporary custody 
where upon the father petitioned for writ of mandate to vacate 
this order. Relying on Civil Code section 5152, the court of appeal 
found that in order for a California Court to have jurisdiction, the 
child must have some significant connection' with California. The 
bringing of the child to California was insufficient. In vacating 
the order ~anting custody to the mother, the court noted that the 
legislative intent in enacting Civil Code Sec. 5152 was precisely 
to discourage parents from violating custody orders by removing 
the child to another state. 
In re Marriage of Ben- Yehoshua, 91 Cal. App. 3d 259, 154 
Cal. Rptr. 80 (5th Dist. 1979). Two weeks after she and her chil-
dren .moved to California from Israel, a wife filed an action for 
dissolution of marriage and child custody. The husband accepted 
service of process when he came to California temporarily but 
then returned to Israel and took the three children with him. The 
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California trial court granted the dissolution to the wife, awarded 
her custody of the children, ordered the husband to pay child 
support, costs and attorney's fees and also ordered the division 
of some property in Israel. 
The court of appeals reversed that part of the judgment 
granting the wife custody and ordering the husband to pay child 
support. The court held that personal jurisdiction over the parties 
had been confused with subject matter jurisdiction over the cus-
tody issue. Since Civil Code sections 5150-5174 give subject mat-
ter jurisdiction over custody matters to the home state or state 
with a significant relationship to the child, Israel, where the chil-
dren had lived all their lives, was the proper place for custody 
determinations. 
In re Marriage of West, 92 Cal. App. 3d 120, 154 Cal. Rptr. 
667 (4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, July 19, 1979. Plaintiff and 
his wife were divorced in England. Mter plaintiff moved to Cali-
fornia, his wife sought and was granted upward modification of 
the support decree in England. Plaintiff denied receiving notice 
of the hearing and, at a California court trial where his divorce 
was established as a California judgment, the trial court termi-
nated spousal support and reduced child support. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had 
not been given adequate notice of the British modification hear-
ing either under California Code of Civil Procedure 1013, which 
requires proof of service, or under British law which requires ei-
ther acknowledgment by the party or inquiry by the Registrar. It 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to terminate 
spousal support since the husband had supported his wife for 
fifteen years following a four year marriage and the child of the 
marriage was almost grown. 
7. Effect of Prior Finding of Nonpaternity 
Ruddock u. Ohls, 91 Cal. App. 3d 271, 154 Cal. Rptr. 87 (5th 
Dist. 1979). Defendant moved to strike a complaint to establish 
paternity brought on behalf of a minor child. Defendant claimed 
that the issue had been fully litigated in an Oregon divorce pro-
ceeding and a finding of nonpaternity had been made. The trial 
court granted the motion, finding that, although the child had 
not been joined as a party in the divorce action, the mother had 
represented the child's interests. 
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The court of appeal reversed, holding that there was no show-
ing that the independent rights of the child had been represented 
in the divorce action and that, in the absence of joinder, such 
rights should not be foreclosed by res judicata or collateral estop-
pel based on a judgment between the mother ~nd alleged father. 
8. Adoption Without Consent of Noncustodial Parent 
Adoption of Murray, 86 Cal. App .. 3d 222, 150 Cal. Rptr. 58 
(4th Dist. 1978). The court of appeal upheld the trial court's 
finding that Civil Code section 224 only allows for the adoption 
of a child without the consent of the noncustodial parent if the 
noncustodial parent has both failed to support and failed to com-
municate with the child for a period of one year. Failure to per-
form only one of these duties is insufficient grounds for denying 
a natural parent the right to object to an adoption. 
9. Testimony of Dependent Children Out of Presence of Parent 
In re Stanley F., 86 Cal. App. 3d 568, 152 Cal. Rptr. 5 (2nd 
Dist. 1978). A mother's petition for rehearing of a disposition 
proceeding that ordered her two children to remain under the 
supervision of the Department of Public Social Services was de-
nied by the Superior Court. The children had been declared de-
pendent children in 1973, and they were placed in foster homes 
where they had remained since that time. 
The court of appeal affirmed the disposition order and de-
. nied the petition for rehearing holding that the referee did not 
abuse his discretion when he excluded the other parties while one 
child testified in chambers concerning whether he wished to live 
with natural parents or foster parents. It was not improper since 
counsel for all parties was present, the testimony was transcribed 
by a reporter and the mother's attorney had the opportunity to 
discuss with the mother the testimony given in chambers. 
The court further held that the disposition order was sup-
ported by substantial evidence when three physicians were of the 
opinion that the mother was not capable of caring for her chil-
dren, the mother was uncooperative in obtaining treatment, the 
children were doing better in foster homes than with their natural 
parents, and past efforts to reunite the family had failed. 
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E. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Evidence of Parent's Living Situation in Action to Modify 
Child Support 
In re Marriage of Fuller, 89 Cal. App. 3d 405, 152 Cal. Rptr. 
467 (5th Dist. 1979). A father who was on medical retirement 
following a stroke moved to reduce his child support obligation 
to his three children of a former marriage. Over the father's objec-
tion, the trial court admitted evidence that the father was living 
with a woman and her child by a previous marriage, and that the 
couple had an arrangement for sharing living expenses. Evidence 
of the woman's income and property was ~dmitted, but the trial 
court excluded as irrelevant evidence of the expenses and obliga-
tions of the woman. The father's motion to modify child support 
was denied. 
The court of appeal affIrmed holding that there was no abuse 
of discretion in admitting evidence of the combined income and 
assets of the father and his nonmarital partner .. All factors relat-
ing to a person's living situation may be properly considered; the 
existence and not the source of money or services available is the 
relevant factor. Since the income of the nonmarital partner is 
being used to reduce the expenses of the father, it in turn affects 
his ability to pay child support. There was substantial evidence 
to support the trial court's conclusion that the pooling of interests 
resulted in a lessening of expenses on the part of the father. Fi-
nally, the expenses of the nonmarital partner were irrelevant and 
properly excluded. 
2. No Right to Jury Trial in Action to Fix Amount of Child 
Support 
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 86 Cal. App. 3d 732,150 Cal. Rptr. 423 
(1st Dist. 1978). Petitioner appeals in propria persona from an 
order to pay $100 child support pursuant to the provisions of the 
Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RU-
RESA), contending that he was denied his constitutional right to 
a jury trial. The issue in the case was whether defendant had an 
obligation to pay child support, and, if so, the amount; paternity 
was not at issue. 
The court of appeal affIrmed holding that fIxing the amount 
of support, under Civil Code section 4700 subd. (a), is a proceed-
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ing equitable in nature (Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 133, 
100 P .2d 806, 812 (1940» and that a jury trial is not available in 
actions in equity. The court further held that petitioner was not 
denied his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
when the judge ordered him to testify since it applies only to 
criminal actions. 
3. Pendente Lite Awards May be Ordered in Child Support 
Actions 
City and County of San Francisco v. Superior Court (Posada, 
Mack and Pressley), 86 Cal. App. 3d 87, 150 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1st 
Dist. 1978). In three separate paternity actions by the City and 
County of San Francisco, as assignee of its AFDC welfare recipi-
ents, against the putative fathers, the trial court, without eviden-
tiary hearing for a preliminary determination of paternity, denied 
plaintiff's motion for orders requiring the putative fathers to pay 
child support, attorney fees and costs pendente lite. 
The court of appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate 
directing the superior court to set aside its orders and upon mo-
tion by petitioner to reconsider the propriety of issuing such pen-
dente lite awards. The court held that Civil Code section 196a, 
which provides for bringing a civil suit to enforce child support 
against a mother or father on behalf of a child, will be governed 
by the same provisions as apply in dissolution actions. In dissolu-
tion proceedings, Civil Code section 4357 specifically grants the 
trial court the power to require pendente lite payments of child 
support, attorney fees and costs. Therefore Civil Code section 
4357 shall be applicable in civil suits to enforce child support 
payments pendente lite. The court also held that the fact that the 
pendente lite award primarily benefits the city and county in-
stead of the custodial parent was of no significance. 
4. Paternity In Issue 
Bartlett v. Superior Court (County of Santa Barbara), 86 
Cal. App. 3d 72, 150 Cal. Rptr. 25 (2nd Dist. 1978). In an action 
by the County of Santa Barbara to seek reimbursement for wel-
fare funds used to support a minor child from the alleged father, 
a nonresident of California, the superior court denied defendant's 
motion to quash service of summons. The court of appeal granted 
a writ of mandate setting aside the superior court's order and 
quashed service. The court held that in personam jurisdiction 
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could not be validly predicated upon the mother's claim that the 
defendant caused the pregnancy and paid certain expenses in 
connection with the pregnancy when the defendant denied pa-
ternity. The mother seeking to collect child support must first 
prove the disputed fact of paternity in a court having jurisdiction 
over the defendant. 
The court further held that Florida's practice of not applying 
its uniform reciprocal support act to cases in which paternity was 
in issue did not require the alleged father to defend in California. 
In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal. App. 3d 848, 152 Cal. Rptr. 
121 (2nd Dist. 1979). In a dissolution of marriage proceeding the 
trial court denied child support to the wife based on the fact that 
the husband was not the child's natural father. The court of ap-
pea~ reversed, holding that the husband was estopped from as-
serting the child's illegitimacy since, from the time of the child's 
birth and for the six years of the marriage, the husband, by his 
conduct, impliedly represented to the child that he was his father 
and intended for the child to accept and act on this representa-
tion. 
People v. Thompson, 89 Cal. App. 3d 193, 152 Cal. Rptr. 478 
(4th Dist. 1979). During a prosecution for failure to support his 
minor son under Penal Code section 270, defendant attempted to 
introduce evidence casting doubt on his biological paternity. The 
trial court sustained the People's objection under Evidence Code 
section 621 which provides that a child born of a woman cohabi-
tating with her husband is conclusively presumed to be a child 
of the marriage unless the husband is impotent or sterile. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that, while paternity 
is an essential element of the crime charged and every element 
of a criminal charge must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
proof of biological parenthood is not necessary since the deter-
mining factor under Penal Code section 270 is whether the legal 
relationship of father and child exists. 
5. Commencement of the Obligation 
In re Marriage of Pearce, 84 Cal. App. 3d 221, 148 Cal. Rptr. 
509 (1st Dist. 1978). In marriage dissolution proceedings, a hus-
band's obligation for child support commenced as of the time the 
trial court pronounced the order for support in open court, and 
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not when the court subsequently signed and filed its formal order. 
The court of appeal affirming the trial court order reasoned that 
since an order for spousal support is operative from the moment 
of pronouncement, a child's right to support should be afforded 
the same disposition. Further, the court held the wife's request 
for attorney's fees in connection with this appeal should be ad-
dressed to the trial court. 
6. Continuing Jurisdiction to Modify Support Obligations and 
Reimbursement For Separate Property Expenditures 
In re Marriage of Epstein, 24 Cal. 3d 76, 592 P .2d 1165, 154 
Cal. Rptr. 413 (1979), modified, 24 Cal. 3d 501a. In a divorce 
proceeding, the court resolved issues of reimbursement of sepa-
rate property expenditures and continuing jurisdiction to modify 
support awards. In this marriage of eighteen years, the wife had 
not been employed since before the marriage and lacked the abil-
ity to provide for her financial needs in the future. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court abused its discretion by terminat-
ing its jurisdiction at the same time as the termination of support 
payments. 
The court held inapplicable the rule of See v. See, 64 Cal. 2d 
778, 415 P.2d 776, 51 Cal. Rptr. 888 (1966) which makes a party 
who uses separate property for community purposes ineligible for 
reimbursement absent express agreement. In this case since the 
expenditure of separate property was post-separation, reimburse-
ment for expenses to maintain the family residence could be 
awarded unless the expenditures were in discharge of a support 
obligation. The court remanded for a trial court finding as to 
whether the expenditure fell within this exception. Additionally, 
the court held that the community was entitled to reimbursement 
for community funds used to pay the husband's tax liability for 
his separate income. 
Finally, the court instructed the trial court to consider, upon 
remand, the capital gains tax liability which would be incurred 
upon sale of the family residence, since the sale was a direct result 
of the court's community property division. 
Gammell v. Gammell, 90 Cal. App. 3d 90,153 Cal. Rptr. 169 
(2nd Dist. 1979). A husband applied to the court to modify an 
interlocutory decree as to spousal support on the grounds that his 
ability to pay had decreased as a result of retirement and his 
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wife's need had decreased due to her part-time job and the appre-
ciation of her property. The court denied relief on the grounds 
that: 1) the wife adequately demonstrated that she still needed 
the support originally ordered and 2) the husband's second wife's 
contribution of her income and assets made up for income lost 
through retirement. 
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court 
properly considered the financial benefits accompanying the hus-
band's second marriage in determining his continuing ability tD 
pay support. 
7. Collection Re"!-edies After Remarriage: Scope of Judicial In-
qwry 
In re Marriage of Barnes, 83 Cal. App. 3d 143, 147, Cal. 
Rptr.710 (1st Dist. 1978). Probate Code section 205 provides that 
a surviving spouse is personally liable for the debts of his or her 
deceased spouse which are chargeable against their community 
property. The decedent's former wife invoked that statute to col-
lect unpaid spousal support due her under the dissolution judg-
ment. She obtained a writ of execution on the judgment and 
levied on the community property of the decedent and his second 
wife. The writ was issued by a clerk without exercise of j\ldicial 
discretion. The trial court ordered the writ quashed on the ground 
that the former wife was required to proceed in a separate action. 
The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the writ should not 
have been issued without judicial inquiry into the extent of per-
sonalliability of the second wife. However, the court disapproved 
the lower court's ruling that a separate action was required, and 
instead held that such inquiry could be conducted on the former 
wife's application for the writ of execution in the dissolution pro-
ceeding. 
8. Reasonableness of Spousal Support Award 
In re Marriage of Winick, 89 Cal. App. 3d 525,152 Cal. Rptr. 
635 (2nd Dist. 1979). In a proceeding dissolving a twenty-six year 
marriage, the trial court ordered the husband to pay one hundred 
dollars per month spousal support for six months and one dollar 
per month thereafter. The court based its decision on the fact 
that: 1) the wife would also have five-hundred and eighty-four 
dollars. a month investment income while the husband would 
have four-hundred and seven dollars per month; 2) the wife's 
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earning capacity was improving while the husband's was declin-
ing; 3) the husband was also paying one-hundred and fifty dollars 
child support per month for each of two children; and 4) the 
seventeen thousand dollar yearly income of the wife and two chil-
dren would be more than two-thirds of what the family income 
was prior to dissolution. 
The court of appeal found that the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in making this award though the case was remanded 
to determine whether or not the judgment conformed with the 
stipulation between the parties. 
9. Effect of Husband's Overpayment on Future Claim 
In re Marriage of Peet, 84 Cal. App. 3d 974, 149 Cal. Rptr. 
108 (4th Dist. 1978). A divorced husband who paid court-ordered 
child support for twelve years, including an overpayment of 
$1205, ceased making payments when his wife moved to another 
state with their son. Three years later, after the son joined the 
military, the wife attempted to collect the unpaid support of 
$1485. Although the purpose of the husband's overpayments was 
unclear, the trial court found that he should be given credit for 
them. In an attempt to consider "the equitable factor," the court 
noted since the wife had not attempted to collect this unpaid 
support earlier, the child had not been harmed financially. The 
court of appeal affirmed and ordered the husband to pay only the 
difference between his overpayment and the unpaid support. 
10. Duty to Reimburse for State Aid After Illegally Removed 
From Custody 
Richards v. Gibson, 90 Cal. App. 3d 877, 153 Cal. Rptr. 561 
(1st Dist. 1979). Mter a Utah divorce decree gave the mother 
custody of two minor children, the father moved to California. He 
was later joined by the children who were sent to live with him 
by the wife who was having problems with her second marriage. 
The father obtained a decree awarding him custody but shortly 
thereafter the wife refused to return the children to him following 
a holiday visit in Utah. Despite numerous efforts by the husband, 
the wife kept the children in Utah and began receiving public 
assistance to support them. 
In an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (Code of Civil Procedure section 1650 et seq.) the 
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trial court ordered the father to reimburse the state of Utah for 
the welfare payments. The court of appeal reversed, holding that 
Civil Code section 207 makes a parent liable for necessities pro-
vided to his child by a third person only if he is neglectful in 
providing such necessities to the child himself. The court held 
that the father should not be liable in this case because: 1) the 
father had been awarded custody before the welfare funds were 
expended; 2) the welfare payments were necessary only because 
the wife illegally kept the children in Utah without means to 
support them; 3) the husband made every effort to bring the 
children back to California where he could provide them with 
food and shelter; and 4) there was no showing the father knew of 
the welfare payments. 
F. HEALTH AND WELFARE IsSUES 
1. Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege 
Huelter v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, 87 Cal. 
App. 3d 544, 151 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1st Dist. 1978). In a dissolution 
proceeding, the trial court granted husband's motion ordering 
production of all medical records in possession of all physicians 
who had treated his wife during their thirteen-year marriage. 
Wife had raised the issue of her physical health which allegedly 
prevented her from working, but she denied any disability based 
on mental condition. Since her internist had in his possession 
records of her psychiatrist, wife objected to the order on the 
ground that compliance with it violated her psychotherapist-
patient privilege. 
The Court of Appeal issued a preemptory writ of mandate 
compelling the trial court to set aside its order. The court held 
that the wife raised only the issue of physical health and not 
mental health, and that the husband failed to make any showing, 
beyond mere speculation, that there might be any connection 
between his wife's psychiatric treatment and her ability to work. 
Thus, the order permitted the husband to obtain records in viola-
tion of the privilege protecting such communications. The mere 
exchange of records between her physician and psychotherapist 
in the normal course of medical treatment did not constitute a 
waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege. 
2. Involuntary Sterilization 
Guardianship of Tulley, 83 Cal. App. 3d 698, 146 Cal. Rptr. 
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266 (1st Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 4, 1978. The Court of 
Appeal affirmed a lower court order denying a petition brought 
by a guardian for the involuntary sterilization of a severely men-
tally retarded woman. The court held that the only statutory 
authority for ordering a person to be sterilized requires the person 
be committed or admitted to a state hospital for the mentally 
disordered or retarded. Welfare and Institutions Code section 
7254. The woman was not so committed. Thus, absent a specific 
statutory provision, the court was without authority despite its 
belief, that in this case sterilization was justified medically and 
socially, and was in the best interests of the woman. 
The court further held that the refusal to grant the petition 
did not violate the woman's constitutional right to privacy. On 
the contrary, where fundamental rights are involved, as in this 
case, the state is mandated to provide adequate procedural safe-
guards to avoid potential abuses. 
3. Fraudulently Obtaining AFDC For Non-existent Children 
People v. Davis, 85 Cal. App. 3d 916,149 Cal. Rptr. 777 (2nd 
Dist. 1978). Defendant appealed from a conviction of fraudu-
lently obtaining aid from the county for non-existent children in 
violation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 11483. The 
court of appeal affirmed the conviction holding that section 11483 
covers false representations to obtain aid for a non-existent child 
as well as such representations for an existing child not entitled 
to such aid. 
The court also held that evidence in the form of a letter from 
the county send one month before prosecution informing the de-
fendant that she had been overpaid and requesting that she con-
tact a welfare investigator to discuss a plan to make restitution, 
satisfied the statutory requirement that the government seek res-
titution as a condition precedent to prosecution for welfare fraud. 
People v. McGee, 19 Cal. 3d 948, 969 n.10, 568 P .2d 382, 393 n.10, 
140 Cal. Rptr. 657, 668 n.10 (1977). 
4. No Reduction For Loan After Wrongful Denial of AFDC 
Burch v. Prod, 90 Cal. App. 3d 987, 153 Cal. Rptr. 751 (4th 
Dist. 1979). An applicant who was wrongfully denied Aid to Fam-
ilies With Dependant Children was given the retroactive aid by 
administrative decision but a reduction was made for a loan she 
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took out to cover expenses during the period following the wrong-
ful denial. The trial court denied the plaintiffs petition for writ 
of mandate. The court of appeal reversed and directed the trial 
court to order the payments to be made without reduction, hold-
ing that a loan obtained under such circumstances cannot be 
considered income for the purposes of reducing the aid. 
5. Physician's Liability for Injury Caused by Intrauterine De-
vice 
Tresemer v. Barke, 86 Cal. App. 3d 656, 150 Cal. Rptr. 384 
(2nd Dist. 1978). A woman brought suit for willful misconduct 
and medical malpractice against a physician for injuries she al-
legedly sustained as a result of the insertion of a Dalkon Shield 
intrauterine device three and one-half years earlier. The trial 
court granted the physician's motion for summary judgment on 
the grounds that: 1) the statute of limitations had run, 2) the 
action was without merit and 3) the plaintiff had presented no 
triable issues of fact. 
The court of appeal reversed noting that both Code of Civil 
Procedure section 340.5, which governs medical negligence 
claims, and Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3, 
which governs personal injury actions based on willful miscon-
duct, contemplate that ~he limitation periods begin to run whep 
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury. 
Therefore, although the device was inserted in 1972, plaintiffs 
claim that she did not discover the cause of her injury unti11975 
should not be summarily dismissed. 
The court of appeal held that the defendant's pleadings 
showed that at the time of the insertion, the Dalkon Shield was 
one of the most popular and acceptable intrauterine devices on 
the market and thus were sufficient to negate any charges of 
willful misconduct or medical negligence. However, summary 
judgment was improper since the defendant had a duty to warn 
the plaintiff when he subsequently learned of the dangers asso-
ciated with usage of the device, and therefore plaintiff had stated 
a cause of action for common negligence and malpractice. 
G. DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS 
1. Determination of Division of Community Assets 
In re Marriage of Afmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 152 Cal. 'Rptr. 
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668 (1st Dist. 1979) modified on denial of rehearing, 90 Cal. App. 
3d 518e. In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court entered an 
interlocutory judgment dissolving the marriage, determined the 
division of community assets, awarded spousal and child support, 
and also awarded the wife $3500 in attorney's fees. The wife ap-
pealed and the husband cross-appealed from certain provisions of 
the judgment. 
The court of appeal affirmed. The court held that the down 
payment on the parties' residence which was at the time of 
prchase made from wife's separate property continued to be her 
separate property. However, the remainder of the purchase price, 
obtained by a loan, was paid from community funds. The 
amounts of separate and community funds were ascertainable 
and the trial court properly computed the division of interests on 
a pro rata basis. The court further held that $1,000 per month in 
spousal support was not inadequate, and that the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in failing to order automatic termination 
of spousal support at the end of some reasonable period of time. 
The court rejected claims that it was error to: 1) exclude evidence 
regarding the value of husband's legal education as a community 
asset; 2) to exclude good will as a valuation factor of the hus-
band's interest in the law firm; and 3) to award attorney's fees. 
In re Marriage of Barnert, 85 Cal. App. 3d 413,149 Cal. Rptr. 
616 (2nd Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
awarded the husband's medical practice to him and the family 
home to the wife. On appeal by the husband, the court remanded 
the case for redetermination of the community property division 
and a reevaluation of the medical practicEt. The court instructed 
the trial court to consider the date of separation and the applica-
tion of the Van Camp-Pereira formula in reverse to determine the 
value of the medical practice. In so doing, the court reaffirmed 
the holding of In re Marriage of Imperato, 45 Cal. App. 3d 432, 
119 Cal. Rptr. 590 (2nd Dist. 1975), which made any portion of 
the value of the business attributable to the earnings of the work-
ing spouse while sep~ated, his separate property. 
2. Bifurcation of Dissolution Judgment From Litigation of 
Property and Support Rights 
In re Marriage of Lush, 86 Cal. App. 3d 228, 150 Cal. Rptr. 
63 (4th Dist. 1978). In a dissolution proceeding, the husband 
moved to bifurcate the trial and for entry of judgment of dissolu-
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tion prior to litigation of support and property rights. The wife 
contended that the court would lose jurisdiction over the support 
and property issues under this procedure and that it would preju-
dice her community property rights and lead to adverse tax con-
sequences. The trial court entered an interlocutory judgment of 
dissolution expressly reserving jurisdiction over the property and 
support issues. 
The court of appeal affirmed holding that the trial court was 
authorized by the Family Law Act (Civil Code section 4000 et. 
seq.), augmented by the Judicial Council rules, not only to bifur-
cate the trial, but to enter a separate interlocutory jUdgment of 
dissolution before other issues had been litigated. The court fur-
ther held that the wife's community property rights would not be 
prejudiced by the judgment of dissolution entered before the 
property and support rights were litigated and that any adverse 
tax consequences were purely speculative. 
Finally, the court held that, even if the wife's contentions 
were correct, the husband would be estopped from asserting any 
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court to make subsequent 
orders for support, property division, attorney fees and any other 
necessary orders. 
3. Wife's Acquisition of Husband's Privileged Documents 
Cooke v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App. 3d 582, 147 Cal. Rptr. 
915 (2d Dist. 1978) hearing denied, Oct. 12, 1978. During the 
pendancy of a marriage dissolution, certain documents which the 
husband intended to share only with his attorney, business asso-
ciates and family were secretly copied by a servant and given to 
the wife who turned them over to her attorney. Finding the docu-
ments to be privileged and confidential, the trial court ordered 
them to be delivered to the husband's attorney. However, the 
court denied the husband's motion that the wife's attorney be 
disqualified from the case. The court of appeal upheld the court's 
determination that the wife's attorney should not be disqualified 
but modified the lower court's order concerning disposal ·of the 
documents. In the court's view, delivery of the documents to the 
husband's attorney went beyond what was necessary to protect 
the husband's privilege. Instead, the wife was ordered to deliver 
the documents to the clerk of the court where they would be under 
seal and available if any of them were privileged. 
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4. Reasonableness of Attorney's Fees 
In re Marriage of Cueva, 86 Cal. App. 3d 290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 
918 (4th Dist. 1978). At a default hearing in a marriage dissolu-
tion, the trial court awarded the wife's attorney sixteen thousand 
dollars in fees bringing the total award of attorney's fees to 
twenty-one thousand dollars. The court accepted the wife's argu-
ment that this fee was justified because: 1) the length of the 
marriage had been twenty-two and one half years; 2) there had 
been considerable difficulty with discovery; and 3) the award was 
less than three percent of the value of the estate which amounted 
to one million dollars. 
The court of appeal ruled that, although determinations as 
to the propriety of attorney's fees in dissolution proceedings are 
within the discretion of the trial court, there were insufficient 
grounds for an award of twenty one thousand dollars. Factors 
besides the size of the estate which must be taken into account 
include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the skill re-
quired, the attention given to the case, the attorney's learning, 
age and experience, the time involved and the scope of the re-
sponsibilities undertaken. 
H. PATERNITY ACTIONS 
1. Indigent's Right to Counsel in State's Paternity Suits 
Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 
529 (1979). In two separate paternity actions, one prosecuted by 
the district attorney in the name of the mother who was on wel-
fare and the other prosecuted by the district attorney as guardian 
of ad litem for the minor child, defendants claimed to be indigent 
and requested appointed counsel. The trial court refused and in 
each case the defendant was found to be the father and ordered 
to pay child support. 
The California Supreme Court reversed both judgments and 
ordered the trial court to appoint counsel if the defendants could 
prove their indigency. The court held that counsel must be ap-
pointed for indigent defendants in all paternity suits in which the 
state is a party or appears on behalf of the mother or child. 
2. Blood Tests Excluded in Establishing Paternity 
Dodd v. Henkel, 84 Cal. App. 3d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1st 
Dist. 1978). In an action to establish paternity and support for a 
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child born out of wedlock, the court of appeal affirmed the trial 
court's exclusion of evidence of defendant's blood type offered to 
show that statistically he could be the putative father. The appel-
late court held that evidence merely reflecting that defendant was 
included within the blood type ~oup (15% of the population) 
consistent with paternity lacked probative value and, in any 
event, was likely to be unduly prejudicial. The court noted that 
the Legislature in enacting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to 
Determine Paternity intended that blood-test evidence was ad-
missible only for the purpose of excluding possible paternity. 
3. Admissibility of Human Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) Test To 
Establish Paternity 
Cramer v. Morrison, 88 Cal. App. 3d 873, 153 Cal. Rptr. 865 
(4th Dist. 1979). In a paternity suit brought by the District Attor-
ney, the jury verdict was in favor of defendant and judgment was· 
entered decreeing defendant not the father of the child. The trial 
judge had granted defendant's motion in limine to exclude results 
of a human leucocyte antigen (HLA) test taken on blood samples 
of the mother, father and child. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that California law 
does not preclude use of HLA test results to prove paternity. The 
test is based on tissue typing of white blood cells and results in 
far higher probabilities of paternity than those yielded by any of 
the red blood cell grouping tests. 
The court also held that the trial judge erred in ruling that 
the prejudicial effect of the statistical results of the test would 
outweigh their probative value. The 98.3% probability that defen-
dant was the father of the child rested on objective data and 
statistical theory based on scientific research and experiment. 
Moreover, absent a statutory mandate excluding highly probative 
scientific evidence on the issue of paternity, policy considerations 
for protecting children from stigma of illegitimacy and enforcing 
parental responsibility to child support argue for broad inclusion 
of such evidence. 
Finally, the court held that the defendant was precluded 
from raising for the first time on appeal the issue that plaintiff 
failed to adduce sufficient evidence that HLA tests were accepted 
in the relevant scientific community as proof of paternity. The 
question of test reliability and its general acceptance in the com-
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munity presents a mixed question of law and fact and the court 
declined to resolve the issue on appeal. 
County of Fresno v. Superior Court (Williams), 92 Cal. App. 
3d 133, 154 Cal. Rptr. 660 (5th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, June 
27, 1979. In a paternity suit brought by Fresno County, the par-
ties stipulated to an extended factor blood test which indicated 
tpat there was a forty-seven percent probability that the defen-
dant was the child's father. The county then sought more sophis-
ticated human leucocyte antigen (HLA) testing, but the defen-
dant opposed the motion and the trial court denied it. The county 
then sought a writ of mandate directing the trial court to order 
the testing. 
The court of appeal issued the writ, rejecting the defendant's 
. argument that the forty-seven percent probability factor had le-
gally excluded him as the natural father. The court held that, 
under Evidence Code section 893, the trial court in a civil patern-
ity suit has no discretion to deny the HLA test where extended 
factor blood testing has already taken place and the defendant 
was not excluded by it. The moving party need not show good 
cause since the existence of the more precise test is sufficient good 
cause in itself. 
4. Prepayment of Blood Test Expenses for Indigent Prohibited 
Michael B. v. Superior Court (County of Stanislaus), 86 Cal. 
App. 3d 1006, 150 Cal. Rptr. 586 (5th Dist. 1978). The district 
attorney brought a paternity action on behalf of a mother and 
child receiving public assistance against an indigent defendant. 
Defendant's motion for blood tests under Evidence Code section 
892 was granted -by the trial court. The court also ordered the 
district attorney to arrange for tests for the mother, child and 
another man and ordered defendant's counsel to arrange defen-
dant's test. The defendant and the other man were ordered to 
share the costs of the blood tests. 
On petition by defendant, the court of appeal issued a writ 
of mandate ordering the superior court to appoint an expert to 
conduct the blood tests pursuant to Evidence Code section 893, 
to fix the expert's compensation and to order the county to pay 
initially, subject to being later taxable to the parties as costs in 
the action. (Evidence Code section 894.) The court held that since 
Evidence Code sections 892 et seq. authorize prepayment by the 
Women's Law Forum 
48
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1978], Art. 12
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol9/iss2/12
1978-1979] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 693 
county for blood tests, it is error to require prepayment by an 
indigent defendant. 
5. Limited Inquiry Into Mother's Sexual Involvement 
Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899; 152 Cal. Rptr. 
210 (1st Dist. 1979). In response to objections by the plaintiff in 
a paternity suit, the trial court limited interrogatories concerning 
her sexual relationships to a period of one year prior to' and one 
year after the likely date of conception. Arguing that such inquiry 
should cover a period no more than three months before or three 
months after conception, the plaintiff petitioned the court of ap-
peal on grounds that any broader inquiry was irrelevant and in-
vaded her right of privacy. 
The court of appeals issued a writ of mandate directing the 
trial court to vacate its discovery order with regard to any inquir-
ies beyond the possible period of conception. The court noted 
that, while the broader inquiry could not be said to be irrelevant, 
absent some affirmative showing that it was likely to uncover 
material information, the mother's right of privacy outweighed its 
utility. 
m. LABOR LAW 
A. WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
1. Compensation Recoverable by Minor Child When Spouse 
Elected Special Benefits 
Department of Corrections v. Workers' Compensation Ap-
peals Board, 23 Cal. 3d 197, 589 P .2d 853, 152 Cal. Rptr. 345 
(1979). The widow of a correctional officer filed a workers' com-
pensation claim for "special death benefits" under Government 
Code section 21363 (Public Employees Retirement System). The 
deceased's minor daughter also filed a claim for death benefits 
under the Workers' Compensation law. Labor Code section 4701 
et seq. Since the widow elected to claim "special death benefits" . 
which are payable only to surviving spouses, the workers' com-
pensation judge ruled that the child was precluded from claiming 
benefits by Labor Code section 4707.·The Workers' Compensation 
Appeals Board (WCAB) , on reconsideration, awarded a death 
benefit to the child on the theory that Labor Code section 4707 
could be construed to allow the child to receive at least the 
amount she would have received if the award was made under the 
Labor Code. 
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The California Supreme Court, after finding the WCAB's 
interpretation of section 4707 unreasonable, annulled the award 
to the daughter and remanded for a determination of whether 
there was good cause for granting an award under Labor Code 
section 4704. The court held that after the widow elected to claim 
special death benefits the clear language of section 4707 pre-
cluded an award to the child. Nevertheless, under Labor Code 
section 4704, the WCAB had discretion in awarding death bene-
fits. The court noted that it is improper to read these statutes 
narrowly to strip death benefits from a minor child who also 
happens to be the dependent of a public employee. Rather, Labor 
Code section 4704 is properly construed liberally to authorize 
payments to dependents denied death benefits under Labor Code 
section 4707 and Government Code section 21364 if "good cause" 
is shown. 
2. Employee Shot By Husband On Her Job Entitled to Workers' 
Compensation 
Murphy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 86 Cal. 
App. 3d 996, 150 Cal. Rptr. 561 (5th Dist. 1978). The court of 
appeal annulled the decision of the Workers Compensation Ap-
peals Board that an employee whose husband shot her at her 
place of employment was not entitled to compensation. At issue 
in the case was whether the shooting arose out of the petitioners 
employment. The court of appeal found the requisite connection 
between the employment and the injury, based primarily on the 
facts that the husband (1) greatly resented his wife's employ-
ment, (2) had threatened to kill 4er repeatedly in the presence of 
her supervisors who nevertheless refused to grant her a transfer, 
and (3) had made a specific threat to her employer the night 
before the shooting which the employer failed to communicate to 
petitioner. 
3. Workers' Compensation Not Exclusive Remedy for Inten-
tional Torts of Employer's Agents 
Meyer v. Graphic Arts International Union, 88·Cal. App. 3d 
176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597, modified, 88 Cal. App. 3d 767f (2nd Dist. 
1979). In an employee's action against her union and certain of 
its agents and officers for assault, battery, false imprisonment 
and rape, the plaintiff alleged that the employees responsible for 
these acts were her employer's agents and had acted within the 
scope of their agency. The trial court sustained the employer's 
demurrer without leave to amend in the belief that the plaintiff's 
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exclusive remedy lay with the Workers' Compensation Appeals 
Board. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that an employer can 
be held liable in a civil action for assaults committed by his or 
her agent. Since the complaint contained an allegation of actual 
agency it was held to be sufficient to withstand a general demur-
rer. 
B. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
1. Removal of Wife From Planning Commission Due to Hus-
band's Election to City Council 
Kimura v. Roberts, 89 Cal. App. 3d 871, 152 Cal. Rptr. 569 
(3rd Dist. 1979) hearing denied, May 24, 1979. The trial court 
ordered a city council to reinstate the plaintiff to her position on 
the city planning commission from which she was removed when 
her husband was elected to the city council. 
The court of appeal reversed, holding that a planning com-
missioner serves at the pleasure of the appointing power and may 
be terminated for any constitutional reason. Since decisions of 
the planning commission are subject to review by the city council, 
the court held that there would or could be actual bias or conflict 
of interest or the appearance of it. The court further noted that, 
contrary to the trial court's interpretation, the reason for plain-
tiff's removal from her position was her husband's election to city 
council and not her exercise of her constitutional right to marry 
her husband. 
2. Civil Service Affirmative Action 
Dawn v. State Personnel Board, 91 Cal. App. 3d 588, 154 Cal. 
Rptr. 186 (3rd Dist. 1979), hearing denied, June 8, 1979. The 
court of appeal upheld the trial court's denial of a petition for 
mandate by a civil service parole agent. The plaintiff was seeking 
review of the State Parole Board's affirmation of a woman's job 
promotion to which plaintiff allegedly should have been ap-
pointed. The court held that the evidence indicated that both the 
male plaintiff and the woman were equally qualified for the pro-
motion and that under those circumstances it was permissible to 
choose the woman in an effort to further the goals of affirmative 
action. 
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C. LEGISLATION 
1. Agency Use of Public Funds to Promote ERA 
Miller v. Miller, 87 Cal. App. 3d 762, 151 Cal. Rptr. 197 (3rd 
Dist. 1978). At issue in this case was what, if any, limitations 
should be placed on the California Commission on the Status of 
Women in their spending of public funds to promote ratification 
of the Equal Rights Amendment. The position of the plaintiffs 
was that, absent explicit legislative authorization, public agen-
cies are forbidden to use public monies in promoting a partisan 
position in an election campaign. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that plaintiffs 
had not made an adequate showing that the Commission was 
involved in impermissible electoral activities as opposed to per-
missible legislative lobbying. 
The court of appeals disagreed, holding that what distin-
guishes lobbying from electoral activities is the audience to which 
the activities are addressed. Here, plaintiffs made an adequate 
showing that the Commission was involved in election campaign-
ing. Since there was no explicit statutory authorization for the 
commission to urge the public to support any legislative or consti-
tutional measures, public funds could not be spent in any such 
pursuit. 
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